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1. Introduction 
In a seminal paper, Singh and Vives (1984) show that Bertrand competition yields higher social 
welfare than Cournot competition if the goods are substitutes and the input markets are 
competitive. In a recent paper, Alipranti et al. (2014) show that when a monopoly input supplier 
(called upstream firm) bargains with the final goods producers (called downstream firms) over 
a two-part tariff vertical pricing contract, the upstream firm subsidises the quantity setting 
downstream firms via negative wholesale input prices. This creates a higher social welfare 
under Cournot competition compared to Bertrand competition. 
The assumption of a negative input price is not economically viable as it will 
encourage the downstream firms to buy an unbounded amount of inputs, since the upstream 
firm would pay the downstream firms for each unit of input they purchase. We, therefore, 
impose a non-negativity constraint on the input prices. In contrast to Alipranti et al. (2014), we 
find that Cournot competition yields lower social welfare than Bertrand competition, thus 
supporting the findings of Singh and Vives (1984) even in a vertical structure. 
 
2. The model and the results 
We consider a model similar to Alipranti et al. (2014) where two downstream firms, denoted 
by Di, 𝑖 = 1, 2, produce differentiated products. Di purchases a critical input for production 
from a monopoly upstream firm, U, through a two-part tariff contract involving a fixed-fee, iF
, and a per-unit price, iw , 1,2i  . U produces the input at a constant marginal cost of 
production c, which is assumed to be zero in line with Alipranti et al. (2014). We assume that 
𝐷𝑖 requires one unit of input to produce one unit of its output, and it can convert the inputs to 
the final goods without incurring any further cost. 
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Assume that the inverse and direct demand functions for Di’s products are 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑎 −
𝑞𝑖 − 𝛾𝑞𝑗  and 𝑞𝑖 =
𝑎(1−𝛾)−𝑃𝑖+𝛾𝑃𝑗
1−𝛾2
, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2; 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗  where, 𝑞𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖  are respectively Di’s output 
and price, and 𝛾 ∈ (0,1) measures the degree of product differentiation.  
We consider the following game. At stage 1, U bargains with Di to determine the 
terms of the two-part tariff contract. At stage 2, 1D  and 2D  determine their outputs (under 
Cournot competition) and price (under Bertrand competition) simultaneously and the profits 
are realised. We solve the game through backward induction. 
 
2.1. Cournot competition 
If the downstream firms compete in quantities, at stage 2, iD , 1,2i  , determines iq  to 
maximise 𝜋𝐷𝑖
𝐶 (𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗 , 𝑞𝑖, 𝑞𝑗) = (𝑎 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝛾𝑞𝑗 − 𝑤𝑖)𝑞𝑖 . Note that iF  is sunk at stage 2. The 
equilibrium output of iD can be found as 
                                𝑞𝑖
𝐶(𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗) =
𝑎(2−𝛾)−2𝑤𝑖+𝛾𝑤𝑗
4−𝛾2
  .                 (1) 
The gross equilibrium profit of iD is  𝜋𝐷𝑖
𝐶 (𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗) = [ 𝑞𝑖
𝐶(𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗)]
2
. 
At stage 1, U bargains with Di to determine the two-part tariff contracts, taking as 
given the equilibrium contract (𝑤𝑗
𝐶∗ , 𝐹𝑗
𝐶∗) with Dj, 1,2i  , i j . Like Alipranti et al. (2014), 
the fixed-fee and the per-unit input price are determined through a generalised Nash bargaining:  
          Max
𝐹𝑖,𝑤𝑖
   [ 𝜋𝑈
𝐶(𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗
𝐶∗) + 𝐹𝑖 + 𝐹𝑗
𝐶∗ − 𝑑(𝑤𝑗
𝐶∗ , 𝐹𝑗
𝐶∗)]
𝛽
[𝜋𝐷𝑖
𝐶 (𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗
𝐶∗) − 𝐹𝑖]
1−𝛽
             (2) 
where   (resp. 1  ) is the bargaining power of U (resp. iD ) and  ,C CU i i i j
i
w q w w  is the 
upstream firm's profit. When bargaining between the upstream firm and Di breaks down, the 
upstream firm’s disagreement pay-off is denoted by 𝑑(𝑤𝑗
𝐶∗ , 𝐹𝑗
𝐶∗) = 𝑤𝑗
𝐶∗𝑞𝑗
𝑚𝑜𝑛(𝑤𝑗
𝐶∗) + 𝐹𝑗
𝐶∗ and 
𝐷𝑗  produces 𝑞𝑗
𝑚𝑜𝑛(𝑤𝑗
𝐶∗) =
𝑎−𝑤𝑗
𝐶∗
2
 as a monopolist. 
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Maximising (2) with respect to 𝐹𝑖 gives: 
                         𝐹𝑖
𝐶 = 𝛽𝜋𝐷𝑖
𝐶 (𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗
𝐶∗) − (1 − 𝛽)[ 𝜋𝑈
𝐶(𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗
𝐶∗) − 𝑤𝑗
𝐶∗𝑞𝑗
𝑚𝑜𝑛].                         (3) 
Substituting (3) in (2), we get the maximisation problem as:  
                 Max
𝑤𝑖
  [𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛽)1−𝛽] [ 𝜋𝑈
𝐶(𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗
𝐶∗) + 𝜋𝐷𝑖
𝐶 (𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗
𝐶∗) − 𝑤𝑗
𝐶∗𝑞𝑗
𝑚𝑜𝑛].                     (4) 
Solving the first order condition gives the equilibrium per-unit input price as 𝑤𝑖
𝐶∗ =
−
𝑎𝛾2
2(2−𝛾2)
< 0. Hence, the negotiated wholesale input price is negative. As per Alipranti et al. 
(2014), the monopoly input supplier subsidises downstream firms’ production via negative 
input prices. However, the downside of this argument is that the downstream firms would want 
to buy an infinite number of inputs, since the upstream firm pays the downstream firms for 
each unit of input they purchase. Hence, a negative input price is not economically viable. 
Therefore, to make the analysis meaningful, we set 𝑤𝑖
𝐶∗ = 0, which means that the equilibrium 
two-part-tariff only consists of a positive fixed-fee, 𝐹𝑖
𝐶∗ = 𝛽 (
𝑎
2+𝛾
)
2
. 
Introducing the non-negativity constraint on the input price, we find the equilibrium 
output and the net profits of the downstream and upstream firms as 𝑞𝑖
𝐶∗ =
𝑎
2+𝛾
, 𝜋𝐷𝑖
𝐶∗ − 𝐹𝑖
𝐶∗ =
𝑎2(1−𝛽)
(2+𝛾)2
 and  𝜋𝑈
𝐶∗ + 𝐹𝑖
𝐶∗ = 2𝛽 (
𝑎
2+𝛾
)
2
. The consumer surplus and social welfare (which is 
Di USW CS    ) are respectively 𝐶𝑆𝐶
∗
=
𝑎2(1+𝛾)
(2+𝛾)2
 and 𝑆𝑊𝐶
∗
=
𝑎2(3+𝛾)
(2+𝛾)2
. 
 
2.2. Bertrand competition 
If the downstream firms compete in prices, at stage 2, iD , 1,2i  , maximises 
𝜋𝐷𝑖
𝐵 (𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗 , 𝑞𝑖 , 𝑞𝑗) = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖) (
𝑎(1−𝛾)−𝑃𝑖+𝛾𝑃𝑗
1−𝛾2
). The equilibrium price and output of iD can be 
found as 
𝑃𝑖
𝐵(𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗) =
𝑎(1−𝛾)(2+𝛾)+2𝑤𝑖+𝛾𝑤𝑗
4−𝛾2
     and      𝑞𝑖
𝐵(𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗) =
𝑎(1−𝛾)(2+𝛾)−(2−𝛾2)𝑤𝑖+𝛾𝑤𝑗
(1−𝛾2)(4−𝛾2)
 .    (5) 
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To avoid analytical repetition, we only report the equilibrium outcomes under 
Bertrand competition that are similar to Alipranti et al. (2014), i.e.,  𝑤𝑖
𝐵∗ =
𝑎𝛾2
4
, 𝑞𝑖
𝐵∗ =
𝑎
4
(
2+𝛾
1+𝛾
) ,       𝜋𝐷𝑖
𝐵∗−𝐹𝑖
𝐵∗ =
𝑎2(1−𝛽)(2+𝛾)(4−2𝛾−𝛾3+𝛾4)
32(1+𝛾)
,   𝜋𝑈
𝐵∗+𝐹𝑖
𝐵∗ =
𝑎2(2+𝛾)(2𝛽(2−𝛾)+𝛾3(1−𝛾)(1−𝛽))
16(1+𝛾)
, 
𝐶𝑆𝐵
∗
=
𝑎2(2+𝛾)2
16(1+𝛾)
 and 𝑆𝑊𝐵
∗
=
𝑎2(2+𝛾)(6−𝛾)
16(1+𝛾)
. 
 
3. Results 
Our main results are shown in the following propositions. 
 
Proposition 1: Cournot competition generates higher downstream profits whereas the 
upstream profit is higher (lower) under Cournot competition compared to Bertrand 
competition for  𝛽 > (<)
8+4𝛾−6𝛾2−5𝛾3−𝛾4
16+6𝛾−6𝛾2−5𝛾3−𝛾4
. 
Proof: We get that 𝜋𝐷𝑖
𝐶∗ − 𝜋𝐷𝑖
𝐵∗ =
𝑎2𝛾3(1−𝛽)(16+6𝛾−6𝛾2−5𝛾3−𝛾4)
32(1+𝛾)(2+𝛾)2
> 0  and  𝜋𝑈
𝐶∗ −  𝜋𝑈
𝐵∗ =
−
𝑎2𝛾3(8−16𝛽+4𝛾−6𝛽𝛾−6𝛾2+6𝛽𝛾2−5𝛾3+5𝛽𝛾3−𝛾4+𝛽𝛾4)
16(1+𝛾)(2+𝛾)2
> (<)0  for  𝛽 > (<)
8+4𝛾−6𝛾2−5𝛾3−𝛾4
16+6𝛾−6𝛾2−5𝛾3−𝛾4
. ■ 
 
Although the downstream profit ranking in our analysis is like Alipranti et al. (2014), 
the rationale behind our results are in line with Singh and Vives (1984), i.e., competition being 
less fierce under Cournot competition compared to Bertrand competition, 1  the former 
competition generates higher downstream profits than the latter. 
The upstream profit ordering, on the other hand, is ambiguous and depends on the 
bargaining strength of the upstream firm. As explained in Alipranti et al. (2014), since the 
quantities are strategic substitutes and the prices are strategic complements, the upstream firm 
                                                          
1   Check that 𝑞𝑖
𝐶∗ − 𝑞𝑖
𝐵∗ = −
𝑎𝛾2
4(1+𝛾)(2+𝛾)
< 0 and  𝑃𝑖
𝐶∗ − 𝑃𝑖
𝐵∗ =
𝑎𝛾2
4(2+𝛾)
> 0.   
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has a higher incentive to charge a relatively lower per-unit input price to iD  under Cournot 
competition compared to Bertrand competition. Thus, Cournot competition creates higher 
downstream profit which the upstream firm extracts through the fixed-fee. Since the non-
negativity constraint on the per-unit input price in our analysis restricts the upstream firm’s 
profit extraction under Cournot competition, its opportunistic behaviour remains (becomes 
less) pronounced under Cournot competition compared to Bertrand competition if the 
bargaining power of the upstream firm is sufficiently high (low), i.e., 𝛽 >
(<)
8+4𝛾−6𝛾2−5𝛾3−𝛾4
16+6𝛾−6𝛾2−5𝛾3−𝛾4
; resulting in a higher (lower) upstream profit under the former 
competition than the latter. 
 
Proposition 2: Cournot competition yields lower consumer surplus and lower social welfare 
than Bertrand competition.  
Proof: We get that 𝐶𝑆𝐶
∗
− 𝐶𝑆𝐵
∗
= −
𝑎2𝛾2(8+8𝛾+𝛾2)
16(1+𝛾)(2+𝛾)2
< 0  and 𝑆𝑊𝐶
∗
− 𝑆𝑊𝐵
∗
=
−
𝑎2𝛾2(8−𝛾2)
16(1+𝛾)(2+𝛾)2
< 0. ■ 
 
The above results are in stark contrast to Alipranti et al. (2014). The non-negativity 
constraint on the input price is responsible for this difference. Lower outputs and higher final-
goods’ prices under Cournot competition (see footnote 1) result in lower consumer surplus 
under Cournot competition compared to Bertrand competition. When 𝛽 is sufficiently high, 
meaning that the opportunistic behaviour of the upstream firm is severe, the loss in consumer 
surplus under Cournot competition than Bertrand competition outweighs the gains in upstream 
and downstream firms’ profits under the former competition than the latter, thus creating an 
overall welfare loss under Cournot competition compared to Bertrand competition. If 𝛽  is 
sufficiently small, i.e., the opportunistic behaviour of the upstream firm is not so strong, the 
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losses in the upstream profit and consumer surplus under Cournot competition compared to 
Bertrand competition dominate the downstream firms’ gain under the former competition than 
the latter, thus generating lower welfare under Cournot compared to Bertrand competition. 
It is worth mentioning that the problem of negative input price persists even if the 
marginal cost of input production is positive, i.e., 𝑐 > 0. Imposing a non-negativity constraint 
on the input price, we show in our working paper (Basak and Mukherjee, 2016) that Cournot 
competition generates lower (higher) social welfare than Bertrand competition if the marginal 
cost of input production is sufficiently low (high). 
 
4. Conclusion 
Alipranti et al. (2014) show that Cournot competition generates higher welfare compared to 
Bertrand competition since the upstream firm subsidises the quantity setting downstream firms 
via negative wholesale input price. Once we impose the non-negativity constraint on the input 
prices, the welfare ranking is reversed. 
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